Bear Stearns Hedge Funds

JoeyDVivre

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No - I'm saying that there is an intelligent coinversation to be had about Bear Stearns hedge fund collapse and what that might mean for other hedge funds, CDO's, markets in general, financing through pooling and traching, and lots of other things. This is an important event - CDO's can change the world - but they run the risk of getting besmirched by stuff like this.
 
For me, the real issue is the rating agencies and the way they look at pools of loans. It seems to make sense that pooling together loans should reduce the risk, like the idea that my stock portfolio endures less volatility (and theoretically risk) as I diversify.

So, they take a bunch of subprime mortgages, slap them together and create a AAA or AA rated MBS. Sounds great, except that what you are really holding is a piece of a bunch of similar loans that are not anywhere near AAA status on their own. The fact that you hold many loans is supposed to mean you are diversified, but I don't believe that is necessarily the case.

What happens when general economic conditions begin to cause defaults rather than individual circumstances? What if loan A isn't defaulting because borrower A just got fired for showing up late to work? What if borrower A got fired because he works for a plastics company that needs to cut costs to cope with rising oil prices? Meanwhile, borrower B can't make the payment because he worked in the homebuilding industry and the burst bubble (read: higher interest rates) cost him his job. Now loan C defaults because borrower C has a long commute and the price at the pump doesn't permit her to make the payment on a mortgage that seemed well within the budget four years ago? Then loan D defaults when the ARM (that he never actually understood) resets. When you are talking about subprime loans, rising energy prices and interest rates will affect all borrowers, and given their financial wherewithal, even small shifts can bring on a rash of defaults.

In my opinion, a bunch of subprime debt pooled together is not AAA. It is still subprime, or pretty close to it. It is like holding a "diversified" stock portfolio of 10 stocks: American Airlines, Airtran Holdings, JetBlue Airways, Continental Airlines, etc. Sure you own several stocks, but you haven't achieved any actual diversification. I look at subprime debt the same way because the borrowers are all in a situation where slight shifts in the economy can have a big impact on their bottom line. They may not be living paycheck to paycheck, but they can't afford to be out of work for very long or to see oil prices, interest rates, food prices, etc. all rising at the same time.

This is not to say I don't recognize the many useful properties of loan pooling, but I feel it has limitations. Slicing and dicing loans to create made to order securities is fantastic, but when you order subprime loans, that is what you get. I don't go to McDonalds expecting filet mignon.

I would love to hear other people's thoughts on this, especially if anyone would like to make the case that in fact the sum total of a bunch of subprime loans is significantly less risky than the loans are by themselves.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at Thursday, July 19, 2007 at 07:22PM by tobias.
 
Your post doesn't address the effects of tranching. It's not just pooling the loans that makes the top tranche AAA. It's the protection that the lower tranches afford.
 
So why did the Bear funds sustain such dramatic losses if they held AA and AAA rated securities?
 
Which is to say that I totally ignored the tranches in my post and would like to understand how even the more highly rated tranches sustained such losses.
 
The answer to that is leverage. They were funding these positions in the leveraged repo market, and since the securities were highly rated they were able to get great terms (haircuts in the ballpark of 5%, maybe even a little less I've heard). The losses on the higher rated tranches ended up being pretty bad (I think most ended up trading hands in the 80 - 90 cents on the dollar range, which is painful for an IG security), but the fund got wiped out because they were levered up 20 times on these things. The securities were highly rated, but they were illiquid and the collateral was homogeneous, which isn't a great combo when the market gets stressed.

Certainly tranching the risk does contribute to the ratings, but i agree with tobias' basic point, the correlation in the asset pools in these deals (and the losses) ended being higher than the assumptions the rating agencies used to model and rate the deals. So yes, the subordinated tranches do contribute to the ratings, but if the loss expectations used to structure the deal don't hold true, then the level of subordination won't be sufficient.
 
Where did you find that info? I haven't been able to find it (i.e., that they were levered up on senior stuff).
 
there was an article on bloomberg yesterday about it under most read...here's an excerpt

Ralph Cioffi, the 22-year Bear Stearns veteran who managed
the two funds, sought to minimize risk by investing in the top-
rated portions of CDOs. Under Cioffi, 51, the funds also borrowed
money in an effort to boost returns. Instead, as defaults surged
on subprime mortgages, they grappled with "unprecedented declines" in the values of AAA and AA securities, Bear Stearns said in the letter.
``That has implications for credit weakness in the next
several days and weeks,'' said Peter Plaut, an analyst at New
York-based hedge fund Sanno Point Capital Management. ``There's
going to be more risk aversion.''
In an interview with the New York Times published on June
29, Bear Stearns Chief Executive Officer James E. ``Jimmy'' Cayne
said the debacle was a ``body blow of massive proportion.''
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. analyst Brad Hintz estimated in a July
16 report that Bear Stearns's profit may decline 6.8 percent this
year as the firm restricts lending to hedge funds and declining
demand for mortgage bonds cuts trading revenue.
 
OK - Thanks I'll find it.

This guy Cioffi must be an idiot. There's this whole idiot core out there who thinks that those ratings mean anything for CDO's. Hint: The rating agencies don't know anything about this and they aren't going to lose any money when your AAA stuff gets clobbered. Why do you think this stuff sells at decent premium to real AAA bonds (yeah, it's just a liquidity issue).
 
I am looking at markets on the ABX, this stuff is getting crushed today.
 
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